Hollings won a special election in November, 1966, to fill the U.S. Senate seat left vacant by Olin D. Johnston’s death in 1965 (and that Donald Russell had filled in the interim). As the winner of a special election, Hollings took the oath of office in December, 1966, before other newly-elected Senators.

Below are descriptions for selected major topics dealt with by the Senator and his staff from 1966 to 2004. The records of some topics, such as the investigation into the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986, are confined to a one or two-year period. Other topics, like U.S. involvement in Vietnam, cover a decade. A few topics, like Budget, have extensive documentation from every year of his Senate service. Topics are in rough chronological order.

**Vietnam, 1966-1971**

Hollings took a ten-day trip to Vietnam in December, 1966. The situation in Vietnam had escalated over the previous year. Troop strength had doubled and air strikes had grown more intense as part of Operation Rolling Thunder. The Senator’s mission was to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation in Vietnam by visiting soldiers and military leaders. Upon his return, he reported to the President and the press that while the U.S. was winning the war in southern Vietnam both militarily and politically, the U.S. stood at a stalemate in the north. Hollings called for an immediate escalation of war in North Vietnam to bring about victory in South Vietnam. Papers relating to Vietnam are found in both Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs. Specifically, material related to Holling’s visit to Vietnam and troop movements in Vietnam are found in Armed Forces. Materials responding to the situation in Vietnam are in Foreign Affairs.

In mid-1970, the Church-Cooper Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act and the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment came before the Senate for consideration regarding military action in Southeast Asia. Hollings supported the Church-Cooper Amendment, which called for U.S. forces and advisors to leave Cambodia and suspend air support for Cambodian forces as of July 1. Church-Cooper passed the Senate on June 30. Hollings opposed the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment that called for the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam on an accelerated timetable. It failed in September 1970.

Hollings supported the Feb. 23, 1971 resolution of the Democratic Senators who adopted as their goal during the 92nd Congress (1971-72) “an end to the involvement in Indochina and a withdrawal of all U.S. forces from that tragic conflict and a release of the prisoners of war by a time certain.” Several withdrawal amendments came before Congress, including the Brooke, Case-Church, Cooper, Mansfield, and McGovern-Hatfield amendments. Hollings supported all but the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, which among other problems did not call for a guaranteed release of soldiers by North Vietnam before the U.S. would announce a withdrawal date.

In November 1970, the court martial of Lt. William Calley began for the deaths of Vietnamese citizens in relation to a U.S. army operation on the village of My Lai on March 16, 1968. Calley was
convicted of premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison, though President Nixon ordered his release in 1974. Calley was the only U.S. army officer convicted on charges related to My Lai. His conviction brought an outpouring of mail from people sympathetic to Calley’s situation. Hollings believed that if Calley was charged and convicted, others in the Army also should be held responsible, believing Calley’s superiors should train soldiers to pay more attention to the laws of war and less attention to body counts.


President Johnson nominated Associate Justice Abe Fortas for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1968. Johnson had appointed Fortas to the Supreme Court in 1965. (Fortas was then-Senator Johnson’s lawyer in a 1948 Primary dispute in Texas.) He was a controversial choice. Fortas was born to Jewish parents in Memphis, Tennessee. He worked in the Public Works Commission and the Civil Service Commission, held the post of Undersecretary of the Interior, and served as an advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations. As an attorney, Fortas had represented several people in front of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Hollings opposed his confirmation, as did other conservative southern Democrats and a slim majority of Republicans. They led a five-day filibuster (on the motion to take up the nomination, not on the nomination itself) that ended October 1 when Fortas withdrew his name from consideration following a cloture vote of 45 to 43 (67 votes were needed at the time for cloture). For his part in the filibuster, Hollings read long passages from James Byrnes’s memoirs.

In 1969, Abe Fortas resigned his position on the Supreme Court. Nixon nominated Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. with a recommendation from Hollings. Haynsworth was a judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and was a native of Greenville, South Carolina. He had attended Furman University and had received his law degree from Harvard University. Opposition to his nomination consisted of conflict of interest concerns and questionable business dealings. Although Hollings continued to support Haynsworth, he was rejected by the Senate in a vote of 45-55.

When Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell vacated his seat in 1987, President Reagan nominated Robert H. Bork to fill the seat. Bork formerly served as U.S. Solicitor General, 1973-1977 and U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge for the District of Columbia since 1982. Hollings was a strong supporter for the confirmation of Bork. Bork’s nomination was highly controversial due to his apparent opposition to civil liberties, including opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Hollings thought Bork was an exceptional lawyer and jurist. He believed that Bork was more liberal about civil rights than most thought because even though he opposed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which banned the use of literacy tests, he has applied in many of his cases. Bork had also written over 100 major opinions, none of which had been reversed. The Senator called Bork’s opponents a “lynch mob,” stirring up controversy with the NAACP. In a 58-42 vote, the Senate rejected Bork’s nomination. In 1988, he resigned from his Appeals Court seat to become a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. There are 13 folders of constituent letters expressing their opinions on Bork’s nomination.

Clarence Thomas was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1991 by President Bush to replace Thurgood Marshall. Thomas had been previously an Assistant Attorney General for the state of Missouri, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights for the Department of Education, and Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In 1990, President Bush nominated him to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. Thomas’ nomination became controversial when a former colleague accused him of sexual harassment. Though the Senate Judiciary Committee was unable to find proof of the accusation, most democrats opposed Thomas’ nomination because they believed that he held conservative views on civil rights. Hollings approved the nomination of Thomas to the Court because of intelligence and experience. Of the letters Hollings received from his constituents on the nomination, some were pleased by this but most expressed dissatisfaction with his decision. In one response to a constituent, Hollings defended his decision by stating, “In fact, in choosing between Harvard erudition and the Thomas record of life, I would prefer, at this point, the Thomas life record.” Thomas was confirmed by a vote of 52 to 48.


Gun control was frequently a topic of legislation in 1967 and 1968, and after Robert Kennedy’s assassination in June 1968, it became more prolific. Measures included state government registration of guns and restrictions on the sale of firearms, including mail order purchases. The Senator’s letters to his constituents indicate he favored the former but would not vote for a measure restricting the sale of fire arms. In one letter (from before Kennedy’s death), dated May 3, 1968, Hollings wrote, “I would vote for a registration of fire arms, as a person registers his automobile, and an accountability in this regard would be of tremendous assistance to law enforcement…I would not, however, forbid the citizen from bearing arms.”

In 1994, two major pieces of legislation relating to gun control were enacted. The first was the Brady Bill which sought to help keep guns from convicted felons by requiring a screening process before purchase of a gun. The process included a five day waiting period for a background check. The bill also required that states link their criminal records database to the FBI database. The second piece of legislation was the Federal Assault Weapons Ban. This bill banned the manufacture and possession of certain assault weapons. Hollings voted nay on both of these bills. Seven folders document these two bills and constituent opinion on the legislation and gun control in general in 1994. In one of his responses on this issue to constituents, Hollings writes, “Time and time again, I have opposed gun control when the issue comes before the Senate, because I believe gun control is best determined at the State level.”

On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold terrorized Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, shooting and killing 12 students and 1 teacher; several others were badly injured. The assault ended with the suicides of Harris and Klebold. That year and into the next, Congress considered several pieces of legislation on gun control. One, the Handgun Safety and Registration Act of 2000, would have required people to report any guns that they have on their tax forms and pay a fee for each firearm owned. This bill never made it out of committee. Another piece of legislation, the Levin Antigun Amendment added to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, would prohibit gun manufacturers and dealers from declaring bankruptcy to avoid lawsuits brought against them. Hollings voted Yea though the amendment did not pass. Another bill introduced, the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1999, would allow for repeat juvenile offenders to be charged as adults in firearm related crimes. Hollings did not vote. Columbine and these three bills brought in thirteen folders of constituent mail. The vast majority of the letters urged Hollings to vote against any new gun control legislation. Many were unhappy with Hollings’ Yea vote on the Levin Antigun Amendment because they felt this went against Hollings’ view that gun control is best handled at the state level.
South Carolina is a large textile-producing state, and in the 1960s this industry was threatened by the unchecked importation of foreign textiles into the American market. In order for the domestic industry to compete more fairly in the marketplace, Hollings fought for import quotas on foreign textiles and an increase in tariffs. Specifically, Hollings supported legislation that would extend Kennedy’s 1961 textile program, which had failed to include wool and made-made fibers with cotton textiles.

Hollings and Strom Thurmond co-sponsored the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act (S. 680). The bill would have mandated increased quotas on textile imports from foreign countries, especially those in South-east Asia. Since the beginning of the decade imports had been rapidly increasing, even with previous quotas in place to help support American textiles. South Carolina’s Senators felt that stronger action was needed to truly limit foreign competition and to keep the textile industry from collapsing in South Carolina. The act attracted bi-partisan support below the Mason-Dixon Line because textiles were central to the economy of many southern states, not just to South Carolina. In the files on the act are speeches, floor statements, memos, correspondence with textile industry leaders, testimony and transcripts from hearings conducted by the Senate Finance Committee’s Subcommittee on Trade, letters from constituents in support of the act, amendment drafts, briefing books, and talking points. Ultimately, the bill was agreed to by both the House and the Senate but vetoed by President Reagan on the grounds that it went too far in protecting the American textile industry. The House could not muster enough votes for an override, so the bill failed for the Congress. However, with the legislation supporting such an important industry for South Carolina, it was not the last time Hollings pushed for such legislation.

Trade and Competitiveness was an important issue for Hollings. He supported bills designed to bolster U.S. manufacturing abroad and to protect it domestically. The Senator was especially worried about challenges to U.S. production both because of the increasing trade deficit and because of foreign gains in the U.S. market. He focused on technology for his proposed bill since he viewed it as a way for the U.S. to stay ahead of international competition, especially the Japanese. As Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Hollings was involved with the bill he sponsored, S. 907, which would have increased technological research and cooperation to help the manufacturing industry and also with the Omnibus Trade Act of 1987. The Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act was broader and spanned ten Senate committees in trying to limit the foreign takeover of domestic markets. Included in the files for S. 907 are reference materials, press releases, memos, letters supporting and opposing trade barriers, issue briefs, and a copy of the bill itself. In the documents for the Omnibus bill are notes, questions, and testimony from Finance Committee hearings on competitiveness, strategy documents for the omnibus bill from the DPC, amendments (including Hollings’ anti-dumping amendment), reference materials, memos, and statements.

The Textiles and Apparel Trade Act of 1987 was Hollings’ bi-partisan bill to support the American textile industry. It was proposed separately from the Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Omnibus Act to allow both bills a better chance of passage. The bill was designed to protect the textile industry from further erosion to increasing foreign competition. It also featured a new way to target foreign textile manufacturers by instituting a global quota instead of focusing on individual countries. There was broad support for the legislation in both chambers but it was vetoed by President Reagan and there were not
enough votes to override. Included in the files is finance committee testimony, statements, press releases, letters from the industry in support, a copy of the bill, petitions for co-sponsors, memos, transcripts of testimony before Committees, analysis of the effects of the bill, fact sheets, amendments, briefings for Hollings, vote counts, and statements.

**NOAA, the coastal zone, and the oceans, 1970-1972**

In 1970, Hollings pushed successfully for the founding of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency that guides the use and protection of ocean and coastal resources and conducts research to improve understanding and stewardship of the environment. As part of President Nixon’s Reorganization plan, the Senate Special Subcommittee on Oceanography held hearings about and oversaw the creation of NOAA. Hollings remained interested in NOAA throughout his term in the Senate.

In 1970, the BASF (Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik) Corporation of Germany planned to build a chemical plant in Beaufort, South Carolina. Due to pollution concerns, Governor Robert McNair asked that an environmental study be conducted on the impact of the chemical plant to the Beaufort area. Hollings introduced legislation to delay construction of the plant until that survey was completed. Hollings explains his feelings on BASF’s plans in a Jan. 1970 letter to the Honorable James Waddell, Jr., “I could be mistaken, but if I had to capsule, I believe the problem is enforcement…Get on the side of enforcement now, and don’t be moved! If there is a bad odor, smell it first; if there is discolored water, see it first; and don’t write the authority when you see or smell. Run down to Miles Burbage and make a headline. If you adopt this course, you will have smooth sailing—plus BASF—plus jobs—plus Hilton Head.”

In 1971-1972, Hollings authored and steered the Coastal Zone Management Act through the Senate in an effort to manage the coastal zone, regulate ocean dumping, and prevent shoreline erosion. In Oct., 1971, the Commerce Committee (with Hollings as a member) held hearings on the legislation and listened with a packed committee room as Jacques Cousteau testified on the condition of the world’s oceans.

The Marine Mammal Protection Act generated the most mail from constituents of any topic in the 92nd Congress, 1971-1972. This proposed act and similar legislation generated an outpouring of correspondence to Hollings, mostly from South Carolina and Alaska. A majority of the letters indicates sympathy for marine life and call for the passage of protective measures. The small amount of correspondence against the act comes mostly from the native peoples and residents of Alaska, who protested the act as unnecessary because the native peoples did not hunt marine mammals for sport; they used them for survival. Hollings supported the Marine Mammal Protection Act which would establish a 15-year moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and create a research program to find methods of lowering injuries to marine mammals sustained in commercial fishing operations. Hollings acknowledged on the Senate floor that the Act was “virtually without precedent. ... [The Act] establishes that U.S. policy is protection and conservation of certain animals well before they are endangered or threatened with endangerment.”

**Hunger, 1969-2004**

In the late 1960s, Hollings examined the malnutrition and poverty existing throughout South
Carolina. Hollings caused a stir in 1969 when he toured South Carolina with I. DeQuincey Newman and others and then publicized the issue and his observations. He expressed his support for food programs like food stamps and school lunch. His efforts are documented in his papers with approximately 20 folders of his statements, memos, correspondence, and the research and reports on nutrition collected by his office. Eleven additional folders hold letters of reaction from South Carolinians, both positive and negative, that give a snapshot of the mood of the state at the time toward hunger issues. Positive responses outnumber the negative. In their letters, constituents reacted to his statements before Congress, to various press accounts, to the 1969 report, “The Case to End Hunger,” that his staff presented to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and to Hollings’ book The Case Against Hunger: A Demand for a National Policy (1970). In the book, Hollings articulated the desperate needs of poverty stricken South Carolinians in his book.

Materials relating to the book’s publication are found in the Press and Media series. As his Senate career continued, Hollings supported the food stamp program and the creation of the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program, and worked to ensure access for South Carolinians to the Head Start program, pre-natal care, and community health care centers.

**No-Fault Insurance, 1971-1972**

The No-Fault Insurance Bill, S. 945, sought to create an automobile insurance system which would pay the basic economic loss of persons injured in automobile accidents whether or not the accident was “no fault.” The bill would extend the right to recover damages to all but would restrict the right to sue for damages in court. States would have to enact no fault laws to provide for coverage of all reasonable medical and rehabilitative expenses, reimbursement for work lost, and other measures. Hollings opposed this bill in its first form, stating in Sept. 1971, “I am not convinced that the tort system created these problems. Hence, I do not believe that elimination of the tort system will necessarily solve these problems.” Hollings rejected the bill again in 1972 after it had been revised because the changes had not addressed his stated concerns with the earlier version.

**Capitol Building’s West Front renovation, 1973**

Construction of the original West Front of the Capitol Building was completed in 1892. Eighty years later, deteriorated exterior walls and an unstable foundation plagued the building. Additionally, the building was overcrowded and its facilities were inadequate for the needs of legislators and visitors. Concerned about the building’s condition, the Commission for the Extension of the Capital sought funds in 1966 to plan a renovation and possible expansion of the West Front. In 1973, plans came to the fore. At the time, Hollings was Chairman of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee. He led the fight in the Senate for restoration of the West Front by working to prevent the proposed extension plans. The House passed a bill appropriating $58 million bill for extension. The Senate held four days of extensive hearings and subsequently passed a bill with $18 million for restoration, not extension. Files include plans, drawings, cost estimates and reports on the renovation and extension project.


The Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act of 1973 encouraged the establishment and
expansion of HMOs with funding through grants and loans. A majority of the files deal with HMOs concern over the withholding of grant funds by HEW to the Health Maintenance Organization of South Carolina (HMOSC). Hollings supported the reform of private health insurance over the establishment of a federally-funded health care system. To this end, he supported the Catastrophic Health Insurance and Medical Assistance Reform Act, though the Senate took no major action on the bill and it died in committee.

Medicaid is health care paid for by the government. Those who qualify for Supplemental security income (SSI) or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) also qualify for Medicaid. It is also the nation’s largest public program helping poor and inadequately resourced kids gain access to health care services. Medicaid covered less than half of the children living below the poverty line in 1984. Medicare is health insurance for people over the age of 65 or who have been receiving Social Security disability payments for more than two years. The Medicare Catastrophic Protection Act, S.1127, expands Medicare provisions to include protection against catastrophic expenses by placing a cap on out of pocket expenses for beneficiaries on Medicare covered services. It would limit the hospital costs to an annual deductible. The Catastrophic Act is proposing its largest expansion since 1965. Only 4.5% of members support the new legislation. Hollings was the only democrat to vote against Catastrophic Coverage. He did so because it does not cover long-term illnesses that do not fall under the definition of “acute illness,” such as Alzheimer’s disease. Also, seniors would pay and the youth would receive its benefits. Catastrophic Coverage was the topic of the majority of the material in Medicare/Medicaid.

The increase in the amount hospitals are spending is more than the increase of Medicare payment rates. Hospitals are losing money on Medicare patients; this threatens hospital closings. Medicare pays urban hospitals more than rural hospitals for the same services. Hollings believed rural hospitals “provide a source of local community pride and identification,” not just health care. SC Peer Review Organization, authorized by Medicare, reviewed in-patient hospital services provided to Medicare patients in the state. The Rural Healthcare Transition program legislation, H. R. 4783, included 15 million dollars for the program. The Long Term Home Care Protection Act also helped in protecting families against rising costs for chronic illness affecting seniors, working, and children in need of home care.

Medicare’s Catastrophic Coverage allowed people to choose whether or not to participate. It also included the expansion of Medicare Part A hospital benefits, which increased the number of consecutive days of home health services to 38. Hollings thought that the Catastrophic Bill was a disaster. Problems he saw with the amendment were that in 1990 it required that mothers and infants have separate eligibility even though a year earlier 9,000 kids were overlooked in the system. The Physician Regulatory Relief Bill allowed doctors to keep billing Medicare for services provided to a patient by a professional who is covering for the doctor. Hollings introduced legislation to delay the phase in of balance billing restrictions from January 1, 1990 to January 1, 1992. Doctors did not like this. The impact of reduced fees may be greater than previously anticipated.

**Watergate, 1973-1974**

The burglary of the Democratic National Committee offices by the Committee to Re-elect the President on June 17, 1972 kicked off the Watergate political scandal that played out over the duration of the 93rd Congress. From the Senate investigations in 1973 to the resignation and pardon of President Nixon in 1974, Watergate brought in a healthy amount of correspondence from Hollings’ constituents.
Files include correspondence, reports and research on the investigation.

**Congaree Swamp National Monument, 1975-76**

During the 94th Congress, the preservation of the Congaree Swamp became, in the words of Congressman Floyd Spence, “the most hotly debated issue” in South Carolina in a number of years. [“Congaree Swamp Getting to Spence,” The State, 5 October 1975] The swamp comprised approximately 70,000 acres along the Congaree River in Richland County. Some 16,000 acres were already owned and protected by the state; the question of preservation in 1975-76 centered around a tract of 14,000 acres owned by the Beidler family. For several years the Beidlers had been selling timber from their landholding. This drew protests from environmentalists, since the land was “the last of the South’s great virgin swamp forests, a pristine place where six of the largest trees in the United States grow.” [“Saws Invade ‘Forest of Champions,’” New York Times, 14 November 1975] Concerned citizens within the state formed the Congaree Swamp National Preserve Association and quickly clashed with the South Carolina Forestry Association, which maintained that the timber industry would be hurt by the loss of logging rights in the swamp.

Many, including some in the General Assembly, felt that the state should acquire the land, rather than the federal government, but the state lacked the money to purchase it, and attempts at land swaps or tax breaks fell through. In early 1976, Spence, whose Second Congressional District included the swamp, introduced a bill in the House authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with the Beidlers, with the stipulation that the state would retain authority over the preserve. In short measure, the South Carolina congressional delegation endorsed the bill—with the exception of Hollings, who called the bill “half-baked” and expressed concern that “the proposal has not been carefully reviewed by the various interests concerned,” including the state and the timber industry. [“Dial 202-224-6121 And Let It Ring: Hollings Now Target of Tree Lovers,” The State, 7 March 1976; EFH to Robert S. Asreen Jr., 7 May 1976]

Hollings’ opposition to the Spence bill garnered him an almost uniformly bad press. He was called the “major obstacle” to preservation, “balky,” “churlish,” and a “spoil-sport”; he was accused of “dragging his feet,” of “truculence and snippiness,” of playing politics, and of favoring the timber industry. He objected strenuously to this portrayal: “Hollings, who has been pictured as the only roadblock to final passage, criticized the press for ‘misrepresenting’ his views on the hotly debated issue.” [“Says Spence Bill Half-Baked: Hollings for Preserving Swamp,” The State, 25 May 1976] He was also the target of a barrage of letters supporting federal protection of the swamp. By August, Hollings caved, and with Senator Thurmond introduced a Senate measure similar to Spence’s, and by 1 October Congress had passed the legislation. The negotiations with the Beidlers were not immediately settled, but a moratorium on logging in the swamp took much of the urgency out of the debate. The swamp tract was eventually preserved as a national monument.

**Postal Service, 1975-76**

The establishment of the United States Postal Service, and the abolition of the old Post Office, came about as a result of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. The postal system became a semi-private entity, with the hope it would eventually be able to support itself without subsidy. The Postal Service’s
new status meant the end of Congressional oversight and patronage for postal jobs. It also meant sweeping changes in management and employment, as the new postal system struggled to get on its feet. By 1975, the public’s patience with the change had run out. Hollings’ constituent mail reflects the widespread complaints that the Postal Service was more expensive and less competent and efficient than ever before. Hollings tended to agree. During the 94th Congress, he made a concerted and highly visible effort to reform the postal system. Most of the complaints which came in received unique (as opposed to form-letter) replies, many of which reflected a genuine impatience and dissatisfaction on Hollings’ part with the shoddy service and poor management reported by the public. In addition, many replies to constituents indicated that Hollings intended to keep their complaints on file, with an eye toward using them at possible Senate hearings.

Not only did Hollings formulate an overhaul of the system, but he used the issue of poor postal service as a platform from which to attract national media attention. A memo from Billy Keyserling, the Hollings aide assigned to postal matters, indicated that the staff saw the issue as one which struck a nerve with the American people: “I strongly believe that the uniqueness of this issue, tied with the comprehensive reform measures of the bill, provide an unusual opportunity for press coverage...I urge that we develop a well-planned and coordinated public relations campaign...Publicity on postal reform allows the opportunity to get in the public eye without being a presidential candidate.” [Keyserling memo, 6 January 1975; in Postal Reorganization Act of 1975, Billy Keyserling’s File.]

Hollings’ 1975 bill, S. 718, failed to pass, but the second session of Congress saw continued postal reform efforts by numerous legislators. Hollings reintroduced his own plan, hoping to draw votes away from S. 2844/H.R. 8603, the most widely-supported reform bill, which he felt did not go far enough. However, Hollings’ amendment in the form of a substitute went down to defeat 58-26, and the Postal Reorganization Act Amendments of 1976 passed instead. Although complaints about the mail continued to come in force during the 95th and 96th Congress, Hollings’ office tended simply to buck these to the Postal Service without comment; a substantial amount of casework (with replies from the Postal Service largely missing) was hence discarded.

Richard B. Russell Dam, 1975-78

On 18 April 1977, President Carter announced that a number of federal “pork barrel” public-works projects would be canceled or delayed. At the last minute, the list was expanded to include the Richard B. Russell Dam, planned for the Savannah River which formed the border between South Carolina and Georgia. The controversy over the project had been ongoing since it was first authorized in 1965-66, and Carter’s plan only escalated the debate further. Those that supported the dam, originally known as the “Trotters Shoals” project, cited the increase in hydroelectric power, as well as the creation of jobs for the area and the recreational benefits of a lake. Those that opposed it argued that there were already two manmade lakes, Hartwell and Clarks Hill (today Strom Thurmond), created by damming the Savannah River. They believed further damming would not only destroy what was left of the wild, scenic river, but would be detrimental to the existing lakes. They pointed to the great expense of construction—an estimated $230 million as of 1975—and to what they saw as a minimal gain in energy as reasons to go along with Carter’s decision.

An especially vocal proponent of the dam was William Jennings Bryan Dorn, the longtime representative of South Carolina’s Third Congressional District, where the dam and lake would be. His
successor in the Congress, Butler Derrick, first supported the project, but after conducting his own research, came to oppose it. He estimated that only two to five percent of the dam’s electricity would be available to the Third District. He was joined by South Carolina’s Governor James Edwards, whose objections included the “high cost, lack of generating capacity, violation of rights of private ownership, and loss of timber and hunting and fishing grounds.” [News and Courier, 17 November 1975]

Nonetheless, Hollings continued to support the project, along with most of the congressional delegations of both South Carolina and Georgia. He noted that he had had doubts about the project early on, but that a great deal of money had already been spent and the dam should be completed. He also pointed out that Carter had supported the project as governor in the early seventies. He explained his reasoning in a letter to Wofford College president Lewis Jones: “When Trotters Shoals was originally suggested, I opposed it because I had met at the site with Duke Power’s people and they stated they wanted to develop it. Obviously, if you can have private investments do it, so much the better. It was when they moved to their Keowee-Toxaway nuclear development that I then moved for the government development. Now having worked there 17 years trying to get an industry in the McCormick area, there is no better way to express it--if a jackrabbit crossed the swamp, he would have to pack a lunch. There isn’t anything there and there is not one industrial site catalogued with the State Development Board.” [22 April 1977]

While the primary concern of the opposing forces seemed to be the preservation of the river in its natural state, Hollings felt strongly that the environmental considerations had been long resolved: “The Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife have studied, considered and reviewed every element of this project. The clear tests contained in the Environmental Policy Act have been applied. The final environmental impact statement was filed with the Council on Environmental Quality in May of 1974....there have been at least seven public hearings on the environmental questions alone.” [Floor statement in debate over FY78 funding for the dam, n.d.] Eventually, funding was restored and construction continued. The majority of Hollings’ mail continued to run against the dam, but he remained firm in his support of the project.

**Energy, 1975-80**

Energy policy and supply emerged as one of the most important and urgent issues of the 1970s. As a member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, which shared jurisdiction on national energy policy with several other committees and federal agencies, Hollings took an active interest in the energy issues of the decade. Indeed, the problems of energy rose to a crisis level: oil prices were skyrocketing, raising the perennial questions about American dependence on foreign oil. There were many solutions suggested by politicians and citizens alike. Proposals for a national energy policy, including Hollings’ S. 70, sought to create one entity to oversee the energy needs of the country. In Jan. 1973, Hollings introduced the Energy Policy Act, S. 70, which sought to create a three-member energy policy council appointed by the President to coordinate energy activities of seventy federal agencies involved in energy policy making. At the committee hearings chaired by Hollings in 1972 and 1973, representatives of business and industry, environmental groups, and citizens expressed support for his proposal from. The Energy Policy Act passed the Senate 79-12 but died in House committee.

Some people recommended stopgap measures, such as the rationing of gasoline; others encouraged longer-range programs, including an increase in conservation efforts and the use of alternatives to oil,
such as solar power, nuclear power, or even a wide-scale return to coal. However, attempts to implement these other sources of energy were soon affected by the 94th Congress’s investigation into the possibility of oil-company divestiture. Some viewed the energy crisis as largely the product of monolithic American oil companies, which tended to control every aspect of drilling for, importing, refining and selling oil. In addition, many companies had attempted to diversify by purchasing interests in the production of coal or natural gas energy. Some legislators feared the broad scope of oil companies’ control would lead to self-serving monopolies with little incentive to lower energy prices; Hollings, for one, was interested in seeing American oil companies reined in by stripping them of some of their side projects. Legislation meant to limit the profit and control of the American oil conglomerates was common through the mid-70s, with measures such as the windfall profits tax and the oil depletion allowance repeal attracting wide support and lengthy debate. Many constituents pointed out that the OPEC cartel was perhaps more at fault for the crisis, but there was little Congress could do to change OPEC policy.

Hollings, as chairman of the National Ocean Policy Study, had more than a passing familiarity with energy research, especially that dealing with offshore drilling and ocean resources. He also was interested in the field of energy conservation, and in 1975-76 he seemed to put a great deal of effort into helping construct a broad-scale conservation strategy—a difficult task because of the numerous small federal agencies which had jurisdiction over energy matters. Perhaps as a result of this confusion, Hollings suggested the creation of a “Council on Energy Policy,” which was intended to reduce the overlapping bureaucracy in the field of energy, and which anticipated the 1977 creation of the Cabinet-level Department of Energy.

The 94th Congress also saw President Gerald Ford as the object of much criticism and second-guessing because of what the Democratic majority in Congress saw as his lack of a coherent energy policy, and the implications the unresolved energy crisis held for the American economy. Perhaps as a result, the Congress appeared to take the lead on energy issues. There were a number of far-reaching energy plans in the works, including Hollings’ own “energy-economy” package. The Hollings plan would have used restrictive taxes on oil companies to allow tax rebates, imposed a quota on imported oil, and enforced temporary gas rationing until domestic energy resources could be further developed. While his legislation was not implemented, Hollings’ outspokenness on the energy issue gained him a great deal of publicity, including an invitation to speak before the American Public Power Association and an appearance on the Today show (13 June 1975) in which he debated a representative of the oil companies.

Natural gas was also at a premium during the years 1975-78. Not only did prices rise, but significant shortages affected many areas, resulting in industrial shutdowns and temporary unemployment—including several South Carolina mills. Congress reacted by drafting numerous natural gas bills labeled as “emergency” measures, including Hollings’ own Natural Gas Emergency Act of 1975, aimed at alleviating the nation’s shortage. Also playing a role in the debate was a widespread suspicion that gas companies, in order to boost prices, purposely withheld gas or took pipelines out of service at peak-usage times.

The primary energy issue affecting South Carolina, besides the general hardships of the energy crisis, had to do with Allied-General Nuclear Service’s plutonium reprocessing plant at Barnwell. Construction had begun on the plant in 1971, despite continuing concerns over environmental impact and the ramifications of reprocessing nuclear fuel. In November 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced a full-scale study of reprocessing to determine whether nuclear materials at such plants were secure, or if they might be used by foreign governments as a source for constructing nuclear weapons.
The Barnwell plant, as well as Tennessee’s Clinch River Breeder Reactor, hung in the balance. Although Barnwell was a private, commercial concern, the company needed to be licensed by the Commission in order to proceed with its work. Early in 1977, Jimmy Carter announced his own concern about nuclear proliferation and the possible role of the plutonium obtained from reprocessing. He would attempt, unsuccessfully, to influence foreign nations toward non-proliferation by planning to “defer indefinitely” plutonium recycling at home, hoping for similar bans abroad.

Hollings, who was a staunch supporter of the Barnwell plant, tried to change Carter’s mind, then quickly moved to ensure continued funding of the plant for the next few years. He wanted to see construction completed, or, failing that, another use found for the portions of the reprocessing plant that were already finished. He was active in negotiating alternate programs for Barnwell in the appropriations process for both fiscal 1977 and 1978.

**Labor Law Reform, 1977-1978**

Labor Law Reform is a popular term used to collectively describe proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). This legislation governs the relationship between unions and employers in the private sector. The NLRA was enacted in 1935, and amended in 1947 and 1959. The law protects the rights of employees to choose to participate in collective bargaining, requires both employees and unions to negotiate, and forbids employers from using unfair labor practices. The NLRA also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to oversee the enforcement of the regulations contained in the act. This board is an independent federal agency with the purpose of preventing and processing cases of unfair labor practices, as well as conducting secret ballot elections in businesses to determine whether a union is desired by the labor force, and which union those people choose.

The Labor Law Reform Act of 1977 was proposed by President Carter to “make the laws that govern labor-management relations work more efficiently, quickly and equitably.” Reforming the NLRA came in the form of over twenty individual bills introduced in both the House and the Senate. Only six of these bills received serious consideration: H.R. 8310, H.R. 8410, S. 1855, S. 1883, S. 1983 and S. 2467. Together, these bills were intended to reform the form and the function of the NLRB. These reforms were in response to complaints criticizing the timeliness of the Board’s activities. It was taking too long for an accusation of unfair labor practices to be heard and decided by the Board. Repeated violations were not being adequately addressed, and the remedies available to the Board were sufficient. As an election facilitator, the Board took too long to schedule and conduct elections. Labor unions also complained that they were not allowed “equal access” to the employees to voice their case.

The Labor Law Reform package addressed the concerns of the laborers by increasing the power of the Board to deal with unfair labor practices. Cases brought to the Board would be heard in a more timely fashion, because the number of Board members would be increased so that more hearings could proceed. The remedies the Board could impose on violators would be expanded, and the amount of time for appeal by violators would be shortened. The concerns of union representatives were addressed by allowing for “equal access,” which allowed the union admission to the work place during hours of operation. Other items included in the reform package were increased back pay for employees fired for union activities, debarment of repeat violators of fair labor practices so that they could not compete for government contracts and regulating the types of fines employers and unions can place on laborers.
Traditionally South Carolina has been against the organized labor movement and the Labor Law Reform package was not able to overcome the anti-union sentiment. Three cartons of constituent mail attest to how vehemently opposed the people of South Carolina were to reforming the NLRA. Hollings saw the reform package as an attempt by unions to re-establish themselves after three decades of declining in their numbers. In particular, the bills would give an unfair advantage to the unions in the guise of “equal access.” Hollings also thought that the NLRB did not need more remedies and increased power to punish manufacturers. With Hollings’ help, all of the bills within the Labor Law Reform package were defeated in the 95th Congress and the NLRA was not amended.

Panama Canal, 1977-78

In September 1977, Hollings endorsed the Carter administration’s proposal to transfer, by way of two treaty agreements, control of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone to the nation of Panama. The stand was not a popular one with many South Carolinians, who argued that the treaties were a “giveaway” to an unstable and communistic government and thus would ultimately undermine U.S. security. Others felt that the Canal was a prime example of American enterprise and ingenuity, and that the benefits Panama derived from its presence were compensation enough. Hollings himself had opposed a similar treaty proposal in the early 1970s, and had maintained strong opposition to the idea of relinquishing the canal as late as May, 1977.

By September, however, he was making a very public case in favor of the treaties, which were signed on 7 September. He devoted a newsletter to the treaties, maintaining that they were “the only reliable and fair way for the United States to keep the Canal to use.” [“The Fritz Hollings Report,” September 1977] A visit to Panama and meetings with Panamanian leaders helped convince him that “the canal can never be safe unless the Panamanians are satisfied that it will no longer be a colonial outpost.” [“South Carolinian Changed His Mind: Hollings Helping Sell the Treaty in the South,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, 23 September 1977] He clearly felt that the turnover of the Canal was the just course of action; in his notes he wrote, “Strength of America lies in the moral force of its position,” and maintained that colonialism had no place in modern American foreign policy.

The Senate vote to ratify the treaties took place on 18 April 1978, with the final result 68-32 in favor - barely more than the two-thirds majority required. The closeness of the vote seemed to make the outcome even more bitter for those who had opposed the treaty; Hollings was the target of a backlash from many constituents. Many wrote harsh letters vowing to work against his re-election. Others threatened to find a way to remove him immediately from office for treason, or named him in lawsuits. Hollings seemed to take such reactions in stride, although he was frustrated throughout the treaty debate by some of the criticism he received in the South Carolina press. An editorial in the Charleston News and Courier calling his decision to support the treaties “premature” led him to respond, “Where is the fairness in your soul?” [EFH to Arthur Wilcox, 10 November 1977] Despite the hostility of many in the state, however, Hollings received acclaim from Senate leadership and the administration for his considered and principled decision. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote, “Your prestige within the Senate, the superb newsletters which you sent to your constituents, and your advocacy of the Treaties before the Foreign Relations Committee made it possible for many of your colleagues to support what appeared to be a difficult enterprise.” [19 May 1978]
**Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II, 1977-80**

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the two superpowers’ nuclear arsenals. The plausible goal was to achieve a strategic balance of weaponry, ensuring the stalemate of “mutually assured destruction” if war began. The United States, at least, hoped that the eventual goal would be a lessening of nuclear power on both sides, if never total disarmament. The first SALT treaty was agreed to by both countries in 1972, but the talks were intended to be continuous, and resumed shortly thereafter. The next treaty, SALT II, was not hammered out until 1979.

Hollings was proud of the fact that he was one of only two senators to vote against SALT I, because he saw it as putting the U.S. at a disadvantage. He kept a close watch on the negotiations, and as the second round of talks drew to a conclusion in 1978-79, he continued to view them and the emerging treaty with suspicion. His primary concern was that any such agreement be equitable in reality as well as on paper; a treaty which gave an advantage to the Soviets was worse than coming to no agreement at all. In his March 1979 newsletter, “Understanding SALT II,” he wrote that “the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union now have created something worse than peril--a false sense of security and a potentially suicidal complacency.” In his opinion, “the perception of superiority is a very real weapon,” one which the U.S. had willingly given up to the Soviets. Carter, on the other hand, maintained that “a SALT treaty will lessen the danger of nuclear destruction, while safeguarding our military security in a more stable, predictable and peaceful world.” [“Now the Great Debate,” *Time*, 21 May 1979, p. 22; *Foreign Affairs*, SALT II, Press, Articles]

Such a result, however, was incumbent upon the Soviets complying with the terms of the treaty--a condition about which Hollings seemed dubious. One of the many Hollings’ Files on SALT II (which have been preserved largely in original order, with original titles) was on “Verification” of Soviet compliance--a difficult if not impossible task for the United States.

Hollings’ research on Soviet arms and on the ramifications of the treaty (found largely in the Hollings’ Files and in Research) was extensive, and his opposition drew attention. The Greenville News-Piedmont noted in an editorial that because he was a Democrat, his “analysis...carries weight.” [15 April 1979] Further, William F. Buckley, Jr. wrote an admiring column about Hollings’ “total mastery of his subject, on this occasion the debate over SALT II....The technical knowledge at the fingertips of Senator Hollings must be the despair of the treaty’s proponents. But his approach is not merely that of the clockmaker diagnosing a faulty design. He evaluates the treaty in the light of political, social and economic trends.” [“A Kennedy-Hollings Ticket?” *Washington Star*, 26 September 1979]

The vast majority of the constituent mail opposed SALT II for much the same reason that Hollings did. A minority urged passage of the treaty, mostly out of fear of the continuing and escalating buildup of nuclear weapons. However, there was greater opposition in the Senate to this treaty than to the previous one, and it was never ratified. The treaty was taken off the table entirely after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

**Tuition Tax Credits, 1977-1982**

The issue of federal aid to private education periodically emerged in Congress, often in the context of declining standards and quality in public schools. During the 95th Congress, thanks in part to a vague
campaign promise by Carter to investigate aid to private schools, the idea surfaced again in the guise of the Tuition Tax Credit Act of 1977. This bill would have allowed a taxpayer with children in private school to deduct fifty percent of the cost of tuition (up to five hundred dollars), and was sponsored by Senator Bob Packwood (R-OR) and an especially vociferous freshman Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY). Hollings quickly emerged as perhaps the most vocal opponent of the bill in the Senate. He did not oppose aiding the families of college students with such a tax credit; in fact, he was concerned about exorbitant increases in college tuition and the ability of the middle class to afford higher education. For elementary and secondary education, however, he was adamant that the costly tuition tax credits would damage both public education and the economy. Moynihan maintained that it was unfair that private-school parents supported public schools, from which they derived no benefit, with their taxes; he also charged that the federal government was trying “systematically” to bring about the ruin of private schools.

Hollings and Moynihan confronted one another, not only in a somewhat bitter floor debate, but also in opposing articles in the Phi Delta Kappan, the publication of the fraternity of professional educators. Hollings wrote of the “tuition tax credit scheme” of August 1978 that “the future of American education hinged on the outcome of this confrontation. Careful study convinced me that this proposal would turn our nation’s education policy on its head, benefit the few at the expense of many, proliferate substandard segregation academies, add a sea of red ink to the federal deficit, violate the clear meaning of the First Amendment to the Constitution, and destroy the diversity and genius of our system of public education.” Hollings was supported in his position by numerous interest groups, including many religious organizations and virtually every association of public school employees, educators, and parents. However, he also met with a substantial opposition force, some of whom were quick to accuse Hollings, and others who agreed with him, of being anti-Catholic. Nonetheless, the Senate defeated the Packwood-Moynihan measure by a vote of 56-41.

Congress considered several tuition tax credit proposals in 1981 and 1982 (among them, S. 550 and S. 2673) that stood to affect elementary, secondary, and higher education. Hollings opposed tuition tax credits and testified in July 1982 before the Senate Finance Committee, stating “Careful study convinces me that tuition tax credits would turn our nation’s education policy on its head, benefit the few at the expense of many, proliferate substandard segregation academies, add a sea of red ink to the federal deficit, violate the clear meaning of the First Amendment to the Constitution, and destroy the diversity and genius of our system of public education.” Materials include general information on proposed bills and related opinions of education organizations, school principals and administrators, and other citizens.

Judicial Selection and Appointment, 1978-80

The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 created 152 additional federal judgeships in the United States, including three in South Carolina. With Democratic president Jimmy Carter in the White House, it fell to Senator Hollings to make the state’s nominations. As early as 1976, South Carolina judgeship-hopefuls speculated that such a bill would pass and, for the next three years, Hollings received numerous applications and recommendations. With the judgeship law on the books in 1978, Hollings appointed a ten-member merit selection committee, chaired by Judge Robert Hemphill, to advise him on the recommendations. Before Hollings made his official nominations in 1979, the committee received recommendations for 62 candidates, screened 42 completed applications, and finally submitted to Hollings a list of its eleven most qualified nominees. From this list, Hollings selected Matthew J. Perry,
Falcon B. Hawkins, and C. Weston Houck as his top choices.

Following some controversy regarding memberships by Hawkins and Houck in racial- and gender-exclusive organizations, all three of Hollings’ nominees were confirmed to the federal bench by the Senate in 1979. With his appointment, Perry became the first black federal judge in South Carolina. The bulk of the material consists of judgeship applications and recommendations, with many of the latter being written by some of the leading Democrats in the state, including William Jennings Bryan Dorn, Marion Gressette, Butler Derrick, and Pug Ravenel.

In November, 1979, District Court Chief Judge J. Robert Martin Jr. took senior status, creating a vacancy for Hollings to fill by nomination. For his selection, Hollings relied upon the same merit selection committee, minus one member, that had earlier screened candidates for the three federal judgeship posts. The one member that was absent was G. Ross Anderson, who applied for Martin’s seat and received the unanimous endorsement of the committee. Hollings nominated Anderson and the Senate confirmed the appointment in May 1980.

**Budget, Economy, and Taxes, 1981-1986**

At the beginning of 1981, President Reagan announced his Economic Recovery Plan, later termed “Reaganomics.” This plan proposed reform in many areas of government, but the overall plan included measures to deal with the economic problems in the country. Reagan proposed drastic income tax cuts along with across the board reductions in federal spending. Appropriations bills were introduced with proposed reductions in departmental spending well into the fiscal years in question. Hollings proposed an alternative plan, and it is documented alongside the President’s Economic Recovery Plan and other federal budget proposals. Balancing the federal budget, both with and without a constitutional amendment, is also a topic documented in this congress.


The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act was a bi-partisan initiative designed to reign in the growing national debt. In limiting deficit spending, the bill relied on caps for the federal government where after a certain point new spending would not be allowed unless offsetting measures were taken. The bill became a law in 1985 in order to help balance the federal budget by the beginning of the next decade. However, because of a provision allowing Congress to interfere in Executive duties, specifically relating to their new ability to dismiss the Comptroller General, the Law was ruled unconstitutional in 1986. An updated version was passed in 100th Congress to deal with this issue. Included in the papers from this Congress on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Bill are memos from Hollings’ office, between the offices of the co-sponsors, and with the Budget Committee. There are also pages of vote counts, the text of the bill itself, notes on the financial aspects of the bill, speeches, amendments, and statements on the floor of the Senate and to the Budget Committee.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a major simplification of the tax code. The bill lowered the tax rate on upper-income brackets and raised the rate for lower-income tax payers while also dropping millions of
the poorest Americans off the rolls completely. In addition, it eliminated the favored tax treatment of capital gains, lessened the deductibility for those holding IRA accounts, increased the purview of the Alternative Minimum Tax, and lowered corporate taxes for companies in the highest commercial bracket. Hollings initially opposed the bill because he viewed it as another way of increasing the national debt and thought the measure took attention away from the larger problem of deficit spending. Included in the topical files for the Tax Reform Act are DPC memos on the bill, summaries of the Senate version, Conference Committee reports, internal office memos, amendments, and a briefing book explaining the major changes to the tax code. Correspondence with constituents both for and against the bill, with the majority against it, is also found among the documents. Much of this was because of provisions changed for businesses and industries, along with the possibility of the loss of tax-exempt status for TIAA-CREF, bonds used to fund local initiatives, and the raising of excise taxes for alcohol. While there are many complaints about the Act to be found in Hollings’ papers, ultimately the reform of the tax code passed the Senate by an overwhelming margin with Hollings’ support.

**COLA, 1982, 1985-1986**

The Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) system was established in 1975 to standardize the adjustments to all federal retirement pension and disability plans. The percentage increase of the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) is used to adjust the benefits for the first quarter of the following year. In 1982, Congress proposed making the benefits increase effective the third quarter of the following year. The COLA reform affected all federal pension plans; including military retirement and disability, social security pensions and disability, and civil service retirement. Papers regarding COLA are filed under civil service retirement.

Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA) are increases to retiree benefits from one year to the next to cover the effects of inflation. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act froze the 1986 Fiscal Year COLA for federal and military retirees, but not for Social Security pensioners. The files included for COLA are entirely letters in response to this suspension of benefits, with a few constituents supporting the measure because it helped to limit the federal deficit. However, the vast majority of the correspondence is from those angry at the unexpected freeze of their benefits, especially because the COLA for Social Security was left alone. Many felt that the deficit should be reduced but saw it as unfair that they were specifically targeted by the freeze while other retirees were not.

**Presidential Advisory Committee on Federalism, 1981-1982**

Hollings served as a member of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Federalism, formed in April 1981 by Executive Order. He also served on the Education Subcommittee. The Committee first met in June 1981 and again in December 1981 and March 1982, and comprised governors, senators, congressmen, state legislators, mayors, county officials, and private citizens. A White House Press Release of April 1981 stated that its purpose was to assist the Administration in “developing long-term policies to reverse the current trend of greater control over state and local programs by the federal government.” Materials in this congress reflect Hollings’ service on the Committee and also include information on President Reagan’s 1982 proposals on New Federalism.
Montreal Protocols, 1982-1983

Two treaties, the Montreal Protocols, came before the Senate for ratification in 1983. The treaties amended the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (to which the United States became a party in 1934) that governed international airline travel liability. Hollings opposed ratification, writing in the New York Times on Sept. 30, 1982, that the Montreal Protocols “...are manifestly unfair, violate the basic tenets of American jurisprudence and impose a costly system of liability insurance that is no more than [a] ripoff of the flying public.”

Latin America and Iran-Contra, 1982-1988

Senator and Mrs. Hollings visited five Latin American nations in January 1982 as members of a U.S. CODEL that included Senators Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) and Paul Laxalt (R-Nev). From January 2 through 14, the delegation visited Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. They met with heads of state, ambassadors, economists, and other government leaders and discussed human rights, terrorism, economic concerns, International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan guarantees, narcotics control, Cuba, and ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty.

The United States’ involvement in Central America escalated in 1983 due to a perceived increase of communist subversion in the region. As of September, 21,000 military personnel were in the area, mostly centered in and around Nicaragua. The Soviets and Cubans were influencing the Sandinista regime, as well as factions in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Hollings was completely opposed to the President Reagan’s plan. He did not think that a military solution was possible in Central America but that it was best solved politically. Hollings supported limited economic and military assistance “to interdict supply of arms.” A goal of peace, including improved human rights, as well as a reduced American presence, was sought by constituents and the Central American Commission.

The Iran-Contra affair was revealed to the public in November, 1986. The U.S. Government had been illegally selling arms to the Iranians in order to fund the anti-Communist Contra forces in Nicaragua. This scheme was concealed both because Congress had prohibited government agencies from aiding the Contras and also because there was a trade and arms embargo against Iran. Hollings was involved with the Congressional investigation because of his seat on the Senate Select Intelligence Committee which was scrutinizing the administration’s actions in Congress. The Senator supported aiding the Contras against the Sandinistas in order to fight Communism but felt strongly that the President had been involved in the cover-up of the government’s actions regarding both countries. He spoke on the Today Show on NBC December 3, 1986 saying, “This charade of all of this going on without any authority has just got to be satisfied, and the President has got to turn it around rather than win one for the Gipper.” The majority of files in the 99th Congress relating to the issue are composed of letters from constituents. There is correspondence supporting Hollings’ role in the investigation, with everything from general words of support to hearty cries for impeachment of President Reagan. Also, there is mail impugning Hollings’ patriotism from those who thought he was wrong to suspect President Reagan’s involvement and letters from those pleading for aid to help the Contras. Memos, floor statements, and the resulting report of the committee’s inquiry are also included in this Congress, although the story broke so late in the term that files are carried over to the 100th.

In the aftermath of the scandal President Reagan openly asked for money to fund the Contras, which
Hollings supported in order to destabilize the Communist Sandinista regime. Hollings also openly supported Oliver North even with his involvement in the scandal, citing that the Lieutenant Colonel was simply following orders and was subsequently left to take the fall. Included in the files is the resolution establishing the Senate Committee to investigate the scandal, letters of support and opposition to the investigation, statements, memos, reference materials, calls for help aiding the Contras from the White House, the Tower Commission Report and reaction to it, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report on the affair, and a budget committee transcript on a hearing for the State Department’s budget. The additional funding was not granted to the Contras and the Sandinista regime was voted out of office 1990.


In the mid-1980s, a popular movement for nuclear disarmament gained national attention. Referred to as “Nuclear Freeze,” the plan presses for negotiations with the Soviets on an agreement which would call for a “mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification” (Dept. Of State, The Nuclear Freeze). At a later date, the nuclear devices still in existence would be disarmed and destroyed. Reagan’s response to the disarmament movement was to support legislation for a freeze “once parity has been established.” Materials on U.S.-Soviet relations are filed in Foreign Affairs; related materials concerning the U.S. Armed Forces’ plans to reduce arms are filed in Armed Services, Arms Reduction Policy.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to limit the use of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) as a defense for both countries. Each nation would only be allowed two ABM deployment sites so that a national defense network could not be built using the technology. The treaty resurfaced in the 100th Congress because President Reagan wanted to ‘reinterpret’ the document as now preventing the development of new ABM technologies. Hollings strongly objected to this change because he saw it as the President limiting the ability of the U.S. to keep up with the Soviets who had not ever construed the treaty in that way and did not plan to. The Senator was at the forefront of the charge to keep the administration from changing the intent of treaty especially because the Soviets had not fully abided by earlier arms limitation treaties. The files for the treaty include memos, hearing transcripts from the original 1972 debate of the treaty, letters from Hollings to his Senate colleagues on the issue, the resolution he wrote to review the treaty negotiation process, research materials, notes on the topic, letters to the editor and to the President to clarify his stance, statements from Hollings and others, and the ABM Treaty Reports from the Office of the Legal Advisor.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987 to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Both sides agreed to destroy their stockpiles and to allow the other country to measure their treaty compliance. The agreement was meant to bring the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries closer to parity as the Soviets had the advantage in conventional warfare. The weapons targeted by the treaty required the Soviets to destroy a stockpile more than twice as large as the United States’. Hollings was concerned about the treaty because he was wary of putting the U.S. and NATO allies at a disadvantage. He specifically lobbied for an amendment to remove ground launched cruise missiles from the agreement since he felt that significantly weakened the U.S. His amendment failed and the treaty was ratified and worked as effective arms control for both countries. Included in the files are memos, issue briefs, documents from the Foreign Affairs Committee, letters from
lobbyists in support of the treaty, notes on Hollings’ amendment, correspondence with colleagues, a copy of the treaty itself, a report on the document by the State Department, statements, and reference material.

**NASA and Space Shuttles Challenger and Columbia, 1986 and 2003**

As Governor, Hollings visited Cape Canaveral (with other southern Governors as part of their annual meeting) on Oct. 2, 1962. Hollings and the other governors were pictured standing on a viewing platform the day before the launch of Mercury-Atlas 8, the 5th manned flight of Project Mercury, the first human spaceflight program. Throughout his Senate career, Hollings was supportive of NASA programs including the Apollo missions to the Moon, the Skylab space station, and the Shuttle, and he served on congressional committees investigating the Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia tragedies in 1986 and 2003.

On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded soon after liftoff killing all seven occupants, including the first teacher in space. It was a seminal event for the nation’s space exploration and prompted both a Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (commonly known as the Rogers Commission, created by Executive Order 12546 on February 3, 1986) and an investigation by the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, with Hollings as chair. Included in the files regarding Challenger are constituent letters ranging from comments on Hollings’ ability to lead the investigation to conspiracy theories on the disaster. Additionally, notes, memos, transcripts of the congressional hearings, speech drafts, and Hollings’ suspicion of White House involvement for the launch to occur on an unusually cold day for political reasons are included. Hollings’ ultimate conclusion that the Rogers Commission would not change the hierarchy of poor decision making within NASA proved presciently true with the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003 that demonstrated that NASA was still willing to conduct launches even if a shuttle’s engineering was in question. Hollings also served on a committee that investigated Columbia.

**Product Liability, 1986**

Product liability insurance was taken up by the Senate because the system was a patchwork of state regulations that varied widely. The aim was to make a uniform federal liability standard that would allow manufacturers to attain better insurance rates in response to a recent increase in insurance prices. Hollings opposed the Product Liability Reform Act of 1986 because he did not feel there was a good enough reason for the federal government to interfere in an area normally reserved for states. Also, he did not think the act would be effective in lowering insurance rates because he did not see an “insurance crisis” caused by product liability suits, but rather by flaws within the insurance and re-insurance systems themselves. Hollings felt that if passed the act would be confusing for courts to interpret because of its vague language and that it would unfairly limit liability for those injured by poorly-made products. Included in the product liability files are memos, correspondence with trial lawyers and manufacturers arguing both for and against the act, internal research to use as a counter against supporters of the bill, amendment drafts, testimony and transcripts from Commerce committee hearings, and reference materials. Ultimately, the Act was not passed in the 99th Congress but product liability would remain an issue that Hollings dealt with throughout his Senate career.
**Campaign Finance Reform, 1987-1988**

The Campaign Finance Reform proposed caps on spending in order to tone down candidates’ fixation with fundraising. Fundraising usually comes in the form of PACs, individuals, political parties and the candidates themselves. It would also level the playing field by ensuring that money is not the main factor for running for federal office. Hollings thinks that most politicians spend their time campaigning for money not for votes. He was quoted as saying, “elections are determined in the financial marketplace.” Hollings thought that the problem was not the campaign contributions but instead the campaign spending. His problem was that soft money, from PACs or voter registration drives, is that it can easily go unreported. The Senator thought that money was compromising the electoral process.

Hollings introduced two amendments to overturn the Supreme Court case, *Buckley v. Valeo*, which set a limit on campaign spending. The first, S.J. Res 21, increased Congress’ power to set a limit for federal office. It also increased state power to set a limit for local and state office. The second amendment, S.2, was proposed in order to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and had three main effects. It would moderate candidates’ fixation with fundraising, shorten the influence of special interests and create a more level playing field for federal campaigns. Hollings favored S. J. Res 21 because it was not costly and also because he thought that S. 2 did not solve the actual problem it just limited the “spending by enticing candidates to agree to the limits by participating in the federal financing of the candidacy.”

**Hurricane Hugo, 1989-1990**

Hugo hit on September 21, 1989 with the coastline between Charleston and Myrtle Beach facing the brunt of the storm. Hugo caused 5 billion dollars in damages alone in South Carolina. Newspapers said Hollings was off to a slow start but was working behind the scenes in Washington D.C. to move funds in the right direction. Indeed, Hollings got approval for 1.1 billion dollars in additional relief funding. He also introduced the Hugo Agriculture Relief Act which included amendments to clarify the Disaster Assistance Act of 1989 (the Drought Bill) and ensure that farmers received urgent relief payments. It would transfer funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the Emergency Watershed Protection Program and the Emergency Conservation Program. The Senator also introduced the Agricultural and Forestry Relief Act in order to clarify the Drought Bill. The Act addresses the national forests that suffered damage from Hugo. It benefited private timber owners. The Drought Bill also did not cover orchards. Hollings changed the criteria to all “related conditions” for Hugo coverage. The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) experienced a lot of miscommunication with FEMA. FEMA almost completely left SCS out of the emergency efforts. SCS was concerned that there were no assessments developed by them. It had never dealt with a project of this size and was not adequately funded but later received 1 million dollars in October of 1989 for relief efforts. Hollings was concerned about the smaller rural areas affected and was outspoken in his belief that FEMA did a poor job responding to Hugo.

**Farm Bill, 1990**

The Farm Bill of 1990, S. 2830, was created because the Food Security Act of 1985 expired on October 1, 1990. A major provision of this bill was that it reauthorized farm programs for another 5
years. Its purpose was to identify food marketing policies and practices that would discourage farmers from using sustainable agricultural methods that would have a good impact. It provided farmer income support, food and rural development programs, price support levels and supply control. Also, included in this bill was a Means Test, which exempted produces from federal benefits if they grossed sales over $500,000. The Farm Bill debate was over how to give farmers more flexibility in making decisions about which crops to plant and harvest. Some issues included loan rates, deficiency payments and the impact on consumer prices. There were many opinions expressed which were concerned that if the policies of the 1985 Farm Bill were the same then many farmers would be unhappy. Hollings voted to put certain restrictions on the use of animals in consumer testing and he also voted to reduce the sugar program loan rate. He agreed to most of the amendments of the 1990 Farm Bill. The Senator also helped sponsor the Graham-Hollings amendment that would reregister the minor use of pesticides.

“Mushroom Cloud” comment, 1992

In March 1992, while a candidate for re-election to the Senate, Hollings toured the Roller Bearing Co. of America plant. While addressing workers there, he responded to criticism from Japanese officials calling Americans illiterate and lazy by saying, “you should draw a mushroom cloud and put underneath it ‘Made in America by lazy and illiterate Americans and tested in Japan.’” This statement proved incredibly controversial and received national and international press attention. Most of the letters received from South Carolinians in Hollings’ Senate office were favorable toward the Senator for his comments and asked him to not apologize. They liked that Hollings spoke his mind and lauded him for standing up for the U.S. Letters from outside South Carolina poured in, as well, and the majority of those letters expressed dismay and embarrassment at his comment; some found his comment to be offensive and promoting of racism.

Base Realignment and Closure, 1990-1994

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is a process used by the Department of Defense to close excess military operations and realign assets, inventory and employees to save money while operating under Department of Defense objectives. From 1990 to 1994, South Carolina was entrenched in the BRAC process involving Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, Charleston Naval Facilities, Shaw Air Force Base, and Fort Jackson. In 1994, Hollings summed up the devastation and frustration of BRAC decisions on South Carolina’s military facilities in a letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Perry. He wrote, “As you know from visits to our state, South Carolina has been devastated, losing a major defense installation in each of the last two rounds. South Carolina was hit harder on a per capita basis than any other state, in the 1993 round. Any decision process that fails to consider the impact of past decisions on a given state or region cannot be labeled as fair.”

In early 1990, Myrtle Beach Air Force Base was first tapped for possible closure. Materials include various staff memos on fact finding missions, correspondence between Hollings and Air Force officials related to the closing process, and studies of the economic and environmental impact of closing the base. Study of these items reveals Hollings frustration with the military’s rationale for closure. In a letter to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, he wrote, “From the onset, Myrtle Beach was on the DoD’s hit list, and the Air Force was only going through the motions to make it appear that a thorough study of other A-
10 bases has been conducted. I find this appalling.” Additionally, Hollings fielded concerns from the South Carolina Development Board and denizens of Myrtle Beach about economic impact to the local community. Ultimately, Myrtle Beach Air Force Base was closed in 1993.

That same year, 1993, the Charleston Naval Facilities were on the BRAC docket. Hollings took this personally. He wrote to a constituent, “Nobody wants the Shipyard to stay open more than I do. I understand the importance of the Yard to our community, to the Defense of our nation, and to the livelihood of those loyal employees who work there. That Yard has been a part of my life since I was a child. My father-in-law worked there for 40 years also, so your father probably knew him.” Hollings, alongside the members of the South Carolina Delegation worked tirelessly to present their case to Navy officials. Materials document the BRAC process from hearings to the voting schedule, peppered with from locals and community officials. As significant reductions in personnel and activities began, Hollings focused on community redevelopment and conversion plans such as the Charleston Navy Reuse Plan. Materials highlight bringing new industry to Charleston including a film studio and helping displaced federal workers with lost benefits and securing new employment. Hollings was successful in bringing relocating workers with the State Department, National Atmospheric and Oceanic Agency and bringing a Defense Finance and Accounting Service Center to Charleston.

Communications, 1994-1996

A major voice in telecommunications legislation, Hollings played a significant role in the efforts surrounding the Communications Act of 1994 and served as the chief Senate negotiator for successful bipartisan legislation, the Telecommunications Competition & Deregulation Act of 1996. A New York Times editorial on Dec. 26, 1995, said of his role, “he rescued the best parts of flawed House and Senate bills passed earlier, added some good ideas and threw out most of the rot.”

Air Quality, 1997

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) revisions for 1997. The Ozone and Particulate Matter Research Act of 1997, S.1084, was introduced July 10, 1997 by Senator James M. Inhofe [OK]. Hollings was originally a cosponsor of this bill; he received many letters from a variety of constituents stating that if the EPA’s revisions were to pass, they would come at major cost to South Carolina’s different industries. Hollings withdrew his support on September 10, 1997.

Tobacco Settlement Legislation, 1997-1998

The Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, sought to create a deterrent for underage smokers and to recoup money for health problems related to smoking. The majority of letters received in the Hollings Senate office expressed outraged at the notion of the additional tax to be placed on tobacco. The letters detail the possible effects of S.1415 -- economic devastation of the tobacco community, challenge to a person’s right to choose, and creation of a black market. Hollings was a main cosponsor for the bill, and he added provisions for tobacco farmers.
Credit Unions, 1997-1998

The Credit Union Membership Access Act, H.R. 1151, brought in more correspondence from constituents than any other single issue in 1997-1998. Letters from supporters of the legislation comprised about eighty percent of the correspondence, while the remaining letters, largely from bank executives, objected to the bill they said gave credit unions an unfair competitive advantage over traditional banks.

Clinton Impeachment, 1997-2000

The material related to the investigation and impeachment proceedings consists of letters from angry constituents—anger directed at either the independence prosecutor or at President Clinton—and documents submitted to the House and Senate related to the investigation and the subsequent trials in the House and Senate. The House proceedings finished in Dec. 1998 and the Senate proceedings began at the start of the new Congress in Jan. 1999.